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Previous research has illuminated the effects of the welfare reform in Canada post-1995. 
However, very little research has focused upon the ways welfare is delivered.  Using four 
supplementary benefits available to social assistance recipients as the backdrop, this paper 
explores the discretionary practices employed in determining eligibility.  Based on interviews 
with lone mothers and a focus group with social assistance case workers the data illuminates that 
a lone mother’s ability to access supplementary benefits is based upon rationing practices which 
may have little to do with her legitimate need and formal eligibility, such that practice, in the 
hands of caseworkers, contravenes the policy intention. 
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Among the multiple effects of post-1995 social assistance reform in Canada are changes 
to the structure of welfare benefits and how these are delivered, which is the focus of this paper. 
Other research has highlighted the drastic effects of the severe rate reductions, the rules 
regarding ‘spouse in the house’, the adoption of the zero-tolerance policy for ‘welfare fraud’, and 
the introduction of workfare, particularly on the lives of lone mothers (Breitkreuz, 2005; 
Christie, 2000; Chunn & Gavigan, 2004; Evans, 1996; Little, 1998, 2001).   A plethora of 
research in both Canada and the U.S. has focused on the “success” of welfare reform on the basis 
of the observed reduction of welfare rolls (Anderson, Halter, &  Schuldt, 2001; Dunton, Mosley, 
& Butcher, 2001; Foster & Julnes, 2001; Frenette & Picot, 2003; Julnes, Fan, & Hayashi, 2001; 
Rickman, Bross, & Foster, 2001; Rickman & Foster, 2001; Westra, 2001). As Herd, Mitchell, 
and Lightman (2005) have argued however, very little research has focused on the welfare 
delivery system whereby an additional layer of welfare policy is effectively constructed through 
delivery practices.  
 
It has been recognized that on discretionary matters such as welfare eligibility, front-line 
decision makers are actually the policy makers (Lipsky, 1984; Pottie & Sossin, 2003). Pottie and 
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Sossin (2003) argue that as front-line workers must apply general and abstract rules to complex 
personal circumstances policy and administration become interchangeable (p. 2).  Sossin (2004) 
recognizes that “how one applies for benefits, how decisions on eligibility are reached, the 
training and qualifications of decision-makers, the degree of personal contact with applicants, 
and the nature and kind of documents which must be produced and verified, are all decisions 
which have a profound effect on applicants and recipients” (p. 1). Thus, decisions made by case 
workers have an enormous impact upon both the receipt and maintenance of a recipient’s 
benefits (Lipsky, 1984; Pottie & Sossin, 2003). Real policy impacts must be assessed by what 
happens on the frontlines.  
 
While considerable research has focussed on the experiences of social assistance 
recipients including highlighting the moral regulatory practices utilized by case workers, 
relatively little is known about the specific decision making processes that case workers employ 
when determining eligibility for welfare benefits.  Moreover, even less is known about the 
allocation of supplementary benefits provided by most provincial social assistance schemes, 
especially the frequency and basis for their provision. These benefits are particularly important 
for low-skilled lone mothers whose exits off social assistance are more problematic than for 
other categories of assistance recipients. Their low human capital, a lack of well-paid and 
flexible jobs, and the necessity of balancing income-earning with the responsibilities accruing to 
sole care-givers cause these families to have longer periods of reliance on social assistance 
(Cumming, Cooke, & Caragata 2008; Evans, 2007; Miller, 2008).   
 
Klein, Day, and Redmayne (1996) have theorized that in the health care system, doctors 
and other health professionals shape health care utilization – and hence policy and practice – 
through rationing practices which are both largely invisible and highly discretionary. Rationing 
helps to manage the increasing gap between effective medical interventions and available 
resources (Kapiriri, Norheim, & Martin, 2007).  In this paper, we suggest the applicability of 
these ‘rationing practices’ as we analyze the allocation of supplementary social assistance 
benefits for lone mothers’ in Ontario, Canada.  
 
Using data from a focus group with social assistance case workers, we explore their 
decision making practices as they determine issues of eligibility.  Additionally, we draw on 
longitudinal interview data from lone mother social assistance recipients to investigate their 
experiences in obtaining, or being denied access to the supplementary benefits available under 
Ontario Works.  
 
The paper begins by briefly setting out the Canadian social assistance policy context, 
focussed primarily on Ontario. We then discuss several key theoretical and conceptual issues 
which guide our subsequent analyses. A methodological description follows and we conclude 
with an analysis of lone mother welfare recipients’ and workers’ experiences and perceptions 
with respect to eligibility/utilization of supplementary benefits. We argue that a policy, which is 
only as good as its delivery practice, requires coherence in its framing and competent, consistent 
application, which is seemingly absent with respect to the allocation of supplementary benefits as 
examined in this study. We suggest that social assistance recipients, particularly single mothers, 
are vulnerable to, at times, poorly trained and highly judgemental workers who are charged with 
the rationing of benefits. Rationing may always be problematic but these issues are magnified 
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when workers have little understanding of the profound relational and material deprivation that 
characterizes so many lone mothers on social assistance. 
 
It is important to note that our focus on supplementary benefits is of particular 
importance in this welfare context because these benefits, if they were fairly and generously 
provided, would significantly ameliorate some of the hardship faced by lone mothers and others 
for whom social assistance exits are more complex than the policy imaginings.  Their rationing is 
particularly frustrating as welfare policy would seem to indicate that their design, in policy, was 
specifically oriented to mitigating hardship in those areas in which supplementary benefits apply.  
 
Background and Theoretical Framing 
 
During the recession of the early 1990s, receipt of social assistance skyrocketed in 
Canada with 3.1 million individuals receiving assistance. As a result, all provinces instituted 
changes aimed at reducing welfare ‘dependency’ (Finnie & Irvine, 2008; Sceviour & Finnie, 
2004). In 1995, the federal government announced drastic changes to social assistance; transfers 
to provinces were substantially reduced and the method of transferring funds moved from cost 
sharing to part of a fixed per capita transfer (Finnie & Irvine, 2008). These changes were 
precipitated by changes in the federal-provincial transfer system from the Canada Assistance 
Plan (CAP) to the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), which in addition to reducing 
overall funding, also removed the stipulation that provinces provide universal access to social 
assistance without conditions. The stage was set for the provinces to cut benefits, impose lower 
income and means tests, and to impose conditions on benefits receipt (Bashevkin, 2002). The 
legitimacy of these actions was enhanced by the timing of the United States led welfare changes 
that claimed a crisis in welfare dependency. Canada, also facing soaring deficits and debt and 
eager to reduce public spending, was able to easily follow suit.  
 
These trends, widespread across liberal welfare states, have approached welfare reform 
through a market-oriented approach known as welfare-to-work or “active” labour force policy 
(Peck, 2005).  In Canada, workfare is but one example of Canada’s increasing shift from a model 
of social citizenship, where all citizens are entitled to a base level of benefits, to a market-based 
citizenship, where entitlements are contingent on labour market attachment (Breitkreuz, 2005). 
This shift is of broad concern but has particular gender and racialized impacts. Among the 
groups most affected are low-income lone mothers. Women generally have different (and less 
remunerative) labour-market experiences than men, a situation which is exacerbated for lone 
mothers due to an increasingly precarious labour market (Caragata, 2003) combined with their 
greater burden of unpaid care work. 
 
Gender and Lone Mothers 
 
In spite of their long standing status as a population with a problematic public image, 
lone mothers receiving social assistance have traditionally been seen to have needs that 
differentiated them from other welfare recipients. The ‘mother’s allowance’ programs of the past 
100 or so years, in a sense acknowledged gender. In Ontario, these provisions ended in 1995 
when the then titled Family Benefits program, with its more generous benefits and limited 
expectations of paid work, was combined with the general welfare Allowance program into a 
69 
Cumming & Caragata  
Critical Social Work, 2011 Vol. 12, No. 1 
 
single Ontario Works program, with drastically reduced benefits and an expectation of labour 
market engagement. These work expectations were imposed equally on lone parents with 
varying but minor work exemptions to those with very young children (Ontario Ministry of 
Community and Social Services, 2010). Public support for such change was enabled by the 
vilification of welfare users, claims that high levels of public debt were due to welfare state 
expenditures, combined with women’s high levels of labour market participation (Bezanson, 
2006; McQuaig, 1995; Teeple, 2001) As all women faced the continuing failure to acknowledge 
social reproduction demands, those unique to single parents were unlikely to receive a 
sympathetic public ear (Bezanson, 2006; Breitkruz, 2005). 
 
It is of course critical to any analysis that acknowledges gender, that more than 85% of 
lone parents are lone mothers and in a Canadian context more than 75% of these lone mothers 
are separated or divorced (Statistics Canada, 2002). Furthermore only 53% of lone mothers 
receive their court ordered child support (Statistics Canada, 2002). Many of these women are 
leaving violence and abuse at the hands of their male partner and this too remains unrecognized 
in policy (Caragata, Cumming, Hogarth, & Alcalde, 2010).  
 
Welfare changes in conjunction with a labour market that has seen unprecedented 
increases in precarious or non-standard employment has created a high level of insecurity for 
lone mothers and their children.  Thus, in spite of the job-promoting thesis of workfare, women 
and their children remain at high risk of poverty and a major component of the social assistance 
population.  In 1996, there were over 1.1 million lone parent families with at least one child 
eighteen or under in Canada, and 83% of these families were headed by women (Beaujot, 2000).  
According to Statistics Canada’s 2006 census, there are 1.4 million lone parent families residing 
in Canada, 80% of them headed by lone mothers (as cited in Dunn,Caragata, & Onishenko 
2007). By 2005, the depth of poverty of lone parents varied from 45% to 70% of the poverty line 
with most below 60% of this level (Dunn,Caragata, & Onishenko 2007).  In this context of a 
growing and vulnerable population estimated to be raising about one third of Canadian children, 
we explore the supplementary benefits that are provided under Ontario Works, the provincial 
social assistance program, which are intended to ameliorate some of the hardships which would 
otherwise be experienced by welfare-reliant families.  We have focused on four supplementary 
benefits, chosen for their significance and potential in ameliorating hardship in lone mother-led 
families: special diet allowance, transportation costs, the shelter enhancement fund, and the 
community start up and maintenance benefit. A description of each follows. 
 
Special Diet  
 
Under the Ontario Works Act, if a recipient and/or her child/ren have a medical condition 
that may cause weight loss, she is eligible for a maximum of $250.00 per month extra under the 
Special Diet benefit, after medical verification.  Pregnant and nursing women also qualify for the 
Special Diet allowance (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 2010). There is a 
predetermined monthly amount attached to each condition that will be added to a recipient’s 
cheque and was subject to annual review; however, this benefit is in flux as a result of 
orchestrated campaigns which sought to broaden the number of persons receiving it (Ontario 
Ministry of Community and Social Services, 2010).  
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Community Start-Up and Maintenance Benefit 
 
This benefit is available to any welfare recipient with one or more dependent children 
who is establishing a new residence or has an exceptional circumstance in her present residence. 
The maximum allowable is $1500.00 once in a 24 month period unless there are again, 
exceptional circumstances (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 2010).   
 
Shelter and Shelter Enhancement Fund 
 
The Shelter Fund is a product of the provincial claw-back of the Canadian federal 
government’s National Child Benefit Supplement from social assistance recipients.  In justifying 
the claw-back, the province of Ontario committed to reinvest social assistance savings into other 
programs that would benefit low-income families with children (City of Toronto, 2008).  The 
Shelter Fund was established to help clients obtain and/or maintain permanent housing and to 
help clients move to more affordable and adequate housing (City of Toronto, 2008). 
 
The Shelter Enhancement Fund differs from the Shelter Fund in that it is only available to 
families with dependent children who have accommodation costs in excess of the shelter 
allowance given under Ontario Works.  This benefit is issued as a flat rate based on family size 
and is only available as transitional assistance, thus is time limited Ontario Ministry of 




Recipients of Ontario Works who participate in any number of approved activities are 
entitled to an extra $100.00 per month to assist with their transportation costs.  These activities 
include employment placement, job finding, skills training, pre-employment development 
programs, volunteering, self-employment development program, and other educational programs 
such as General Educational Development (GED) or literacy and basic skills programs (Ontario 
Ministry of Community and Social Services, 2010). 
 
This brief descriptor highlights only those special benefits discussed here, having been 
chosen on the basis of their frequency of use or potential significance in terms of the scale of the 
benefit. Key to understanding the processes by which these benefits are allocated is the idea of 
worker discretion. Discretion – at a conceptual level – derives from the idea that as regulations 
and mandated procedures are put into practice by workers; they may fail in allowing for an 
appropriate level of individualization (Diller, 2000; Evans & Harris, 2004). 
 
  These considerations have been long reflected in social services administration, often 
seesawing between, on one hand, privileging individualized responses through extensive 
discretion only to have such policies overturned in favour of highly scripted service delivery 
practices. These issues, discretion and individualization versus routinization and uniformity of 
benefits and their delivery, have been the focus of significant discussion in the fields of child 
welfare and social assistance delivery (Diller, 2000; Evans & Harris, 2004). 
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Classical theorizing on discretion posits that it operates on two fronts within the social 
service arena; “distributive and regulative” (Shnit, 1979, p. 439). Regulative discretion refers to 
the interventionist nature of discretionary power of the social service worker to either limit or 
eliminate those basic human rights and civil liberties available to citizens outside social services. 
The distributive aspect of discretion allows the social service worker leeway to either “comply 
with a request for the provision of a care service rather than to institute treatment against the 
party’s wishes or those of the family” (Shnit, 1979, p. 440). Discretionary power is also used to 
determine the extent to which circumstances and facts conform to rules and guidelines set out by 
policies and thus hypothetically allows for a certain (and potentially positive) amount of 
flexibility (Lipsky, 1984). 
 
According to Diller (2000) and Evans and Harris (2004), where workers lack 
discretionary power, rules and procedures are followed without regard for individual 
circumstances. Arguments in favor of strictly codified practices suggest that fairness or equality 
derives from the ‘sameness’ of treatment or response and from the transparency of actions and 
outcomes. The absence of discretion is too, at times, a reflection of public confidence that 
workers have sufficiently skilled and fairly and appropriately applied judgment to make good 
discretionary decisions (Diller, 2000; Evans & Harris, 2004). 
 
High levels of discretionary power in the provision of social services usually suggest a 
belief that service responsiveness will be enhanced when workers – who are believed to know 
and understand clients’ needs - are enabled to have broader decision-making powers. Thus, 
discretion has often been seen as a more progressive and individualized response. We believe 
this idea is however, problematized when discretionary powers are linked with a culture and 
orientation focused on the rationing of benefits. In these environments, which we suggest to be 
the prevailing context for the delivery of social assistance in Ontario, worker judgment is 
influenced and more likely reflects the dominant organizational culture of restraint and rationing, 
rather than clients’ best interests. Thus, we see the relevance of Klein et al.’s (1996) theory of 
rationing as it is taken up in the allocation of supplementary welfare benefits. The administrative 
processes by which public welfare systems are managed have the effect of minimizing the extent 
to which people seek welfare assistance. Thus, as Lipsky (1984) argues, we need to know what 
welfare workers do. While the Ontario Works Act (1997) states that any recipient entitled to 
supplementary benefits shall receive them, the wording of the Act allows for case worker and 
supervisory discretion in allocating benefits (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social 
Services, 2010). 
 
The allocation of scarce resources shapes rationing practices at a macro or societal level as 
we establish welfare benefit rates or broad categories of eligibility for any social good, such as 
the age of old age pension receipt. At this macro level, rationing might be considered less 
problematic – because even though it may exclude and deny benefits to a large segment of a 
population - there is usually reasonable transparency with respect to the outcomes and their 
rationale (Maher, 1990 as cited in Wayland & Kleiner, 1997).  At a more micro level, rationing 
determines resource distribution at an individual level, while theoretically also optimizing the 
choices made by the clinician and the patient (Maher, 1990 as cited in Wayland & Kleiner, 
1997).  It is our contention that social assistance case workers and their managers in the 
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allocation of supplementary benefits available under social assistance employ these micro-level 
rationing practices. Klein et al. (1996) identified nine types of rationing:  
 
• Rationing by denial. Services are denied to specific individuals, or client groups. 
Particular forms of help may be excluded from the menu of services available. 
• Rationing by selection. Staff ‘select in’ those individuals thought to have most to gain 
from the intervention; be deserving cases; or least likely to cause problems. 
• Rationing by deterrence. Access to services is made difficult, for instance receptionists 
are unhelpful, telephone messages are not passed on or answered; information leaflets are 
not freely available. 
• Rationing by dilution. Demand is diluted by reducing the quantity and quality of services 
provided: no-one is excluded, but instead everyone receives less. 
•  Rationing by delay. Access is discouraged through delaying tactics: appointments are 
weeks ahead; correspondence is slow; waiting lists are in operation. 
• Rationing by deflection. Agencies protect resources by channeling prospective clients to a 
different program, service or organization. 
• Rationing by substitution. Cheaper services are offered. 
• Rationing by termination. Services are withdrawn; cases are closed. 
• Rationing by charges. Charging policies are developed, and service users contribute 
towards the costs of the services they receive. 
 
As we discuss and analyse data from the longitudinal interviews with lone mothers and the 
caseworker focus group we will specifically assess the extent to which these varied forms of 
rationing behaviour appear to be in play with respect to supplementary welfare benefits. 
However, even prior to this detailed analysis, it appears that the idea of ‘worker discretion’, 
which especially in social work has long been associated with promoting the best interests of the 
client, has shifted to reflect an increasingly management and accounting-oriented welfare 
system. We preliminarily suggest – and will look to the data for verification - that reflected in the 
discretionary power of welfare workers is a major ideological shift which emphasizes the 
rationing of what is purported to be a scarce social benefit to be allocated only in the face of the 
direst need. 
 
The idea of ‘need’ too requires the briefest discussion as it is the ultimate determinant of 
what level of a social good should be provided.  Need is a heavily contested concept – and this is 
made readily apparent by the strong ideological differences in how poverty should be measured. 
There are those who argue that needs are the barest of provisions for survival and that anything 
more by way of a social benefit acts as a disincentive to work and is thus unfair to those who 
earn what minimal amount they have. Amartya Sen (2000) powerfully argues that need is a 
normative concept that must be meaningfully assessed against the norms and expectation of the 
society of which one is part. Contrary to those who argue a poverty line based on need as merest 
subsistence, Sen suggests that deprivation is relative and encompasses both material and 
relational deprivation. Meeting needs must include sufficient resources to guard against material 
deprivation – but also against what he describes as “relational” and “capability” deprivations - 
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Lone Mothers: Building Social Inclusion is a Community-University Research Alliance 
(CURA) project. The funding body is the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. This research project includes a national longitudinal study of the implications of labour 
market and welfare policy change for the lives of poor lone mothers (Caragata, 2003).  
 
The qualitative component of this research has been guided by a feminist participatory 
methodology. A longitudinal panel of approximately 110 lone mothers in Toronto, St John’s, and 
Vancouver, Canada was established, with interviews occurring every 8-12 months over a four-
year period. Lone mothers on social assistance were selected and trained as Research Assistants, 
and conducted a majority of the interviews. The remaining interviews were conducted by women 
researchers, including academic partners, doctoral student research assistants, or project staff. 
For this paper, we analyzed the interviews from two rounds of semi-structured interviews with 
forty-two Toronto lone mothers on social assistance.   
 
The single mothers interviewed in Toronto were purposively selected to ensure diverse 
backgrounds including age, numbers of children, time on welfare, newcomers to Canada, and 
Aboriginal persons. All of the women were receiving social assistance and all had at least one 
child residing with them when they agreed to participate in the research project. 
 
Also reported are data from a focus group, which was conducted with social assistance 
case workers employed by the Toronto Employment and Social Services (TESS). These 
individuals were convened to explore how workers perceive the lives of lone mothers and their 
positions as caseworkers.  Focus group participants were recruited through an email sent by the 
Toronto Employment and Social Services to their caseworkers informing them of the research 
and inviting their participation in a non-employer run focus group. Seven social assistance 
caseworkers attended the focus group, representing seven different welfare offices within the 
TESS.  Five participants had been employed as caseworkers for between 5 and 8 years and two 
for between 15 and 20 years. The focus group was three and a half hours in length and occurred 
after two rounds of interviews had taken place with lone mothers receiving social assistance. The 
focus group was held to illuminate some of the issues that continually resurfaced in the lone 
mother interviews including their reporting ‘arbitrarily’ losing supplementary benefits and being 
frustrated by being denied, without explanation, benefits, such as community start up or the 
shelter enhancement fund.  It was in this context that case workers were asked to discuss their 




Discretionary power is accorded to caseworkers under the Ontario Works Act (1997), 
which makes clear both the allocation of supplementary benefits on the basis of need and gives 
workers the right to assess and adjudicate such need (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social 
Services, 2010).. This discretionary power reinforces the power imbalance between worker and 
client and leaves clients vulnerable to ‘luck of the draw’ in terms of worker willingness to 
approve supplementary benefits. 
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Discretionary power – or policy-to-practice decision making - can be framed in policy, 
either generously or narrowly, and ‘corrected’ as necessary if policy makers believe a policy is 
being ‘incorrectly’ applied. Three of the participating caseworkers were quite optimistic about 
their potential to ameliorate some of the hardships lone mothers receiving social assistance 
experience, through the provision of supplementary benefits. Wendy expressed gratitude that she 
was working in a much more “kind” policy environment where “legislation is softer” than in the 
late 1990s. According to the case workers “there’s all of this money” available through 
community start up, shelter funds, special diet, and transportation funds that can help alleviate 
some of the financial hardship faced by lone mother led families. These case workers were 
adamant that there were many resources available and that they were required to say “no” to their 
clients less often than in the past.   
 
This study shows that while the case workers may feel that they are far more generous 
than in the past, a complicated system of bureaucratic disentitlement occurs.  As  Herd, Mitchell, 
& Lightman, (2005) argue, in the current Canadian social assistance environment, administrative 
processes impose secondary barriers to benefits receipt and to continued eligibility for social 
assistance by encompassing a “deliberately cumbersome and complicated application process, 
excessive and inappropriate requests for information, and deliberately confusing procedures and 
language” (p. 76).  These barriers are prevalent in the data and highlight the rationing practices 
that appear to be employed in the allocation of supplementary benefits.  The following findings 
illustrate the ways in which case workers and managers ration by deterrence, dilution, selection, 
and deflection.  These appear, in the data, to be the most significant of Klein et al.’s (1996) nine 
identified types of rationing, although there are also data that point in smaller ways to other types 
of rationing. In addition we discuss apparent discrepancies that occur between welfare offices, as 
well as the rationalizations that case workers employ when explaining their choices in the 
rationing process. 
 
Rationing by Deterrence: The Power of Information 
 
When discussing health care, Klein et al. (1996) argued that rationing by deterrence 
entailed making access to services difficult by not passing on important information to the client. 
The control of benefit information is revealed as a major constraint to receiving supplementary 
benefits in social assistance.  The relationship between the case worker and client is power laden 
as the case worker controls the information that is given to the client thereby affecting the 
client’s knowledge of benefits for which they may be eligible and even more critically 
establishing the nature of the relational power dynamic. 
 
When case workers were asked if they discussed or provided information about 
supplementary benefits with their clients, Tracy asserted that clients are all given a ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ booklet in which all of the benefits are listed in “fairly clear terms” (One of the 
authors has repeatedly requested a copy of this booklet but it has not been made available).  
However, most case workers acknowledged that merely handing over a booklet is problematic as 
there are at times language barriers.  Some case workers argued that even for those without 
language barriers, the process of applying for social assistance and meeting a case worker for the 
first time is overwhelming and thus this information is easily lost in the shuffle. This process 
alone deters many from even applying for social assistance in the first place (Herd et al., 2001; 
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Lipsky, 1980). Additionally, Angie contended that it is hard to keep their clients informed as 
“there's lots of changes.... it's hard to keep up with all the changes. The different amounts may 
change, who's eligible for certain benefits may change”. It is not clear how, or if, such changes 
are reflected in the ‘booklet’ reportedly given out. 
 
Lone mother interview data reveals significant lack of or misinformation regarding 
eligibility criteria for supplementary benefits. While several of the recipients appear to qualify, 
they insisted that they were not informed about a particular benefit or were told, without 
explanation, that they did not qualify. Donna, a lone mother with two children, including a 
newborn, was residing with her sister and niece at the time of both interviews. Donna explained 
that she was in dire need of furniture. She applied for the community start-up allowance when 
her first child’s father left and her claim was denied.  When asked why she was ineligible, Donna 
stated that she was unsure and replied, “[my case worker] just says no, you can’t apply for it, 
you just split up with your ex so…  I don’t know.  I didn’t really get into it…”.  
 
Lone mothers who have social networks that share information fare better than those 
without such access. The comments of Patricia and Ann are indicative of the agency lone 
mothers can manifest when they have the right information but also their experience of 
seemingly arbitrary welfare decisions being made without accompanying information:    
 
Well, I was getting a special diet and they cut me off for a couple of months [but] I 
started getting it back again because I went through [grassroots activist group].   
 
When Patricia was asked why she was cut off, she replied, “they just did”.    
 
Being on the system and meeting some people on the system, I found out a lot more about 
the system.  Every year I find out more, and more, and more.  And you realize that…even 
the first time when I moved, they have a shelter fund… When I moved the first time, we 
had no couch.  I sat on the floor.  Our T.V. was on the floor.  I had a mattress on the 
floor.  That’s how we lived for a long time.  Then when I got a student loan I used it to 
buy a couch, instead of using it to fix myself up to look good to go get a job.  See, I didn’t 
know that we were supposed to get a moving allowance… my worker never told me.”   
Marcia’s comment too reflects the power of information.  Through informal networks  
 
Marcia learns of benefits that her case worker, whose primary obligation should be her 
client’s best interests, might have advised her of: 
 
I hear that the social services give money for children like my sons. My son has asthma 
and my other one is sick with sickle cell and those things. So, I’m wondering if we [might 
get a special diet benefit] 
 
Marcia is effectively denied the benefit and like many of our interview respondents, she 
is deterred from pressing her request, as she assumes that if she were eligible she would have 
been told. 
 
Madison offers this summing up with respect to the transmission of information:  
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“I mean -- like, I find that -- again, there are probably some great case workers, but I 
think on the majority from what I've seen and been through, and from what other people 
have been through, a lot of them don't tell you unless you ask.”   
 
Rationing by Deterrence: Highlighting the Power Dynamic 
 
The relationship between the case worker and her client can at times act as a deterrent to 
asking for supplementary benefits.  Some of the lone mothers expressed fear of arbitrarily losing 
their benefits and thus avoided their case worker as much as possible. Julie feels so strongly 
about the negative interactions she has with her worker, she willingly sacrifices benefits in order 
to avoid her: 
 
“I don’t really have any interaction with [welfare].  As little as possible.  I mean, people 
were saying “Oh, you could have got $200.00 for clothes to go back to school and blah, 
blah, blah” and that’s fine, and that’s great that people can do that, but I just -- you 
know what?  I just – I don’t even – I just want– the least interaction with them, the least, 
and I know that that’s not the way it should be.  … I’m terrified they’ll cut me off…all 
because of a technicality, or something, because somebody didn’t fax my paperwork, or 
when I moved offices, or – because that’s what happened to me with my transportation 
allowance and my special diet.  It was just – it just stopped. … So – like, things like that 
just makes me not trust them. 
 
Samantha echoes a similar feeling of being both vulnerable and dependent, yet she is not 
prepared to forego what she sees as her rights. The consequence for Samantha is having to cope 
with the feelings of stress that derive from the resulting conflict with her worker. Choosing to 
challenge the worker’s power has consequences that will play out in subsequent interactions. 
 
“I kept getting in fights with my social worker quite a bit. I told her, look what do you 
expect from me. I’m going to high school. … I’m doing a computer course and you know, 
I’m volunteering over at [culturally specific community agency]. I’m doing as much as I 
can and you know you keep on giving me grief about the littlest thing. She didn’t really 
want to give me a Metro Pass, for going to high school…” 
 
Rationing by Dilution 
 
The case workers acknowledged that some clients, when possessed of the right 
information, can effectively negotiate around stringent policy guidelines. Several case workers 
indicated that their clients had discovered ways in which they could obtain a special diet 
supplement.  Prior to 2005, the special diet supplement was granted to any Ontario Works 
recipient whose medical practitioner identified a health condition that was affected by their 
inability to purchase enough food to eat properly. The benefit allowed up to $250.00 extra per 
month (Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), 2005).  The Ontario Coalition Against 
Poverty (OCAP) held several community clinics with medical practitioners who signed 
significant numbers of people up for the supplementary benefit.  In response to the influx of 
people suddenly eligible for the benefit (between 2002 to 2007, in Toronto, Ontario alone, the 
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number of benefit recipients increased from 5000 to 30,000 people) the Liberal government 
revised the policy, replacing it with a more stringent benefit that assigns a dollar value to specific 
illnesses or ailments. Only those illnesses identified are eligible and a physician must 
substantiate the claim (Levy, 2007; OCAP, 2005). Rose explained how this change in policy 
affected her family: 
 
“With welfare for a while there, there was something called special diet you could get, 
and it’s up to $250 each for you and your child … For awhile I was eligible for that extra 
$500 and I was getting it and it totally helped my situation. I could afford to buy the right 
food, I could afford to buy her clothes if she grew…and then they cut it, because they 
realized that everybody…that nurses were helping people to get it. So they cut the whole 
program out. So now even if you’re HIV positive and losing huge amounts of weight, 
they’ll give you $25 a month for Ensure.” 
 
As information regarding the availability of the special diet allowance became 
commonplace, the high demand for the benefit effectively lead to the Canadian Government 
retracting it1. While this is an unusual case, it does support the contention of many lone mothers 
and community activists, who believe that it is difficult to obtain full and complete information 
about supplementary benefits and the criteria for eligibility. When such information is protected, 
the kind of community organizing that brought the special diet supplement to so many needy 
families cannot happen. The effect of rationing by dilution is apparent in the current special diet 
provisions, which are very limited in scope and tightly tied to very specific medical conditions. 
The approval of Special Diet now requires stringent sign off by a physician. Going forward, 
doctors are not likely to take any risks in prescribing Special Diet, as they were previously 
publicly vilified by the province over special diet (Globe and Mail, 2009). 
 
Rationing by Selection 
 
 According to the individuals interviewed for this research, the lone mothers’ who are able 
to exercise agency and fight for their rights appear to fare better – at least in the short run -  than 
those who do not protest the decisions of their case workers. This is because case worker 
decisions are often based on their value judgments rather than strictly on a client’s eligibility for 
a particular benefit. When clients protest, they tend to receive the benefits to which they are 
entitled.   Klein et al. (1996) found that health care staff privilege individuals whom they identify 
as having the most to gain or are most deserving of intervention. Similarly case workers 
acknowledged that they too assessed their clients based on some standard of deservedness. 
According to the caseworkers, lone mothers who are quiet and reserved are often the ones who 
are most in need and yet receive the least amount of help. It is perhaps not surprising that what 
might be seen to be quiet or compliant clients are assessed by their workers as deserving.  This is 
illustrated by Angie who stated, “[the] funny thing I've noticed is lately a lot of my clients I feel 
deserve things are the ones who are being soft, and the ones who are totally off base [and] 
aren’t doing anything are the ones who sometimes get things that I believe they shouldn’t”. 
Michelle also argued that loud aggressive recipients tend to fare the best in terms of the amount 
of extra benefits they receive, “whether you're a single parent or whether you're a single person, 
                                                 
1 As this article was being revised for publication the special diet benefit has again undergone a change 
which will further restrict eligibility and reduce the allowable benefit. 
78 
Cumming & Caragata  
Critical Social Work, 2011 Vol. 12, No. 1 
 
in my office if you shout you will be rewarded, you will get the benefits”. Angie articulated her 
‘frustration’ with ‘undeserving’ clients: “no matter what I deny them, they will just go to the 
supervisor or to the manager and scream to high hell and get what they want because they are a 
single mother and they know nothing will ever happen to them. So said and so done”.  While this 
discussion has certain parallels with the earlier discussion regarding clients who independently 
access benefit information and then use this profitably in their request for supplementary 
benefits, it is interesting to note how the caseworker discourse constructs those clients who push 
for what they need as ‘undeserving’. Ultimately, these ‘undeserving’ clients may, through their 
willingness to challenge case worker judgments, get what they in fact deserve.  
 
This caseworker discourse was modified by some caseworkers’ awareness of the way 
interpersonal and interactional issues between workers and clients – they were able to 
acknowledge their power and the ways in which some types of people just ‘rub each other the 
wrong way’.. While some of the case workers discussed their frustration with “loud”, 
“aggressive” and “undeserving” lone mothers receiving extra benefits, they simultaneously 
acknowledged that at times the personality of a case worker can instigate such behaviour from 
their clients. Angie argued that:  
 
“…there [are] a few caseworkers who you should hear them talk to clients, it’s 
unbelievable! And then you think, you wonder why every second client you have you’re in 
an argument with, you help fuel the fire, right? I think that some workers after years and 
years, they take things personally, they get fed up with the system, and they're just 
disgruntled.”    
 
In a sense, rationing by selection has always played out in the social welfare system as 
those seen to be deserving were more likely to be accorded social goods (Herman, 1999). Lone 
mothers have always been morally suspect (Little, 1998) and this moral assessment continues, 
largely under the radar through rationing by selection. 
 
Rationing by Delay 
 
Klein et al. (1996) argued that access to care is often discouraged through delaying 
tactics, including appointments that are scheduled weeks ahead, slow correspondence and/or 
documents that are misplaced or lost and must be resubmitted.  The case workers acknowledge 
that this is an inadvertent reality for them due to the nature of their jobs. Like just about all other 
employers, TESS, has over the last 20 years, been forced to reduce spending and as a result has 
significantly changed the role of its frontline welfare workers. Now as much responsible for 
financial allocation and monitoring as anything else, the idea of case workers as social workers 
has been significantly eroded. Julie was part of a pilot project and as a result reported having the 
lowest number of cases, 68, while Tracy reported the highest caseload, at 135 cases. All of the 
caseworkers discussed the frustrations associated with maintaining such heavy case loads, 
especially when they maintained ‘generalized’ as opposed to ‘specialized’ case loads. Angie 
echoed the sentiments of many of the case workers stating, “We were better off when we were 
doing specialized caseloads because I think it's better to be a master of the craft”. Caseworkers 
felt strongly that specialized caseloads allow the workers to become more familiar with the extra 
benefits and programs that one specific group of individuals is entitled to receive. Additionally, 
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the case workers asserted that large caseloads place unrealistic demands upon their time and are 
not conducive to serving the client’s needs appropriately. As was discussed earlier, the large case 
loads make it increasingly difficult for case workers to keep their clients informed of changes as 
well as termination dates for time sensitive benefits. 
 
Irrationality of Rationing 
 
 Although the Ontario Works Act (1997) is clear on the eligibility requirements for their 
supplementary benefits, there were profound differences between the offices that the case 
workers represented. Throughout the case worker focus group, Michelle was frustrated with the 
differences between welfare offices and argued that case workers needed to adhere to rules and 
regulations of the policy regardless of the attitudes of their supervisors.  In reference to some 
welfare offices not allocating transportation costs to eligible recipients, she argued “it's in black 
and white even if [the supervisors] don't want to give it to you. You can prevent that [supervisor 
refusal] and say ‘this is what the policy states, and this is what we’re mandated to do’”. 
However, in defense of case workers who do not fight for their clients, Wendy stated: “people 
don't want to ruffle the feathers on supervisor’s heads…  So even if you know better, you don’t 
always want to go over the supervisors head”. 
 
The discrepancy in the allocation of supplementary benefits between the seven offices 
that the case workers represented was the most disconcerting revelation of the focus group. The 
case workers often engaged in surprised conversation with each other as they compared benefit 
allocations among offices and were often bewildered when listening to the others describe the 
“climate” in their respective offices.  Given the wide ranging discretion that is enabled in 
allocating supplementary benefits, these office by office differences are not completely 
surprising. The welfare climate has changed – from a social service/best interest of the client 
model to a management/cost accountability model. However, in this process, there remain 
‘holdouts’ – both managers and case workers who were part of the previous system. The new 
culture, which is one of restraint, rationing, and ‘need as survival’ has not been made fully 
functional. As an illustration of how this culture has changed in Toronto, Canada’s largest city 
and 4th largest welfare delivery body, welfare workers used to be – almost without exception – 
trained in a social service or social science related discipline. Over the last 15 years, recruitment 
also focuses on those with management and business backgrounds. Clients have become 
customers. Thus, with respect to service rationing, the possibility afforded by discretion enables 
individuals – and in some cases whole office – to adopt a more liberal understanding of benefit 
entitlement.  
 
When hearing of the stringent rules governing the allocation of funds in particular offices 
Julie proclaimed: 
 
“…that’s why I say I think it depends on the climate of your office because [in] my office 
we usually push to give. And now there’s a push that we should be…developing a rapport 
with the clients even more in my office. … now if we go in their home and you see that 
there's a need and you can justify[the benefit], they’ll say just give them what they need 
now. So that’s why I think it all depends on what’s being trickled down from the 
particular offices.” 
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Angie expressed her frustration with having a supervisor who will override any decision 
she makes if a client calls to complain:  
 
“Another frustration is that you have all this legislation on paper, and you're there and 
you're carrying it out, and all the client has to do is talk to your supervisor and your 
decision is overturned. That makes you look like the bad guy. That I don't like at all. So 
you're fighting with the client but in reality are just doing what [you] are supposed to do 
[according to] the policy. …I wish there was sometimes more of an even keel…” 
 
While Angie’s supervisors overturn decisions she has made in favor of the client, many 
other case workers articulated experiences with supervisors that were quite the opposite.  Julie 
argued that when you want to advocate for your client you learn which supervisors are more 
miserly than others, thus, ‘supervisor shopping’. She stated: 
 
“In my office we have about 10 or 12 supervisors depending on which training 
supervisors are there or who is visiting, god knows.  If you go and ask each of the 
supervisors a question you will get 10 or 12 different answers. And it's really bad 
because when I get to sit with new people who are just coming in, and they'll say they 
need to get this stuff, and I'll say you need to take it to supervisor so-and-so. Because you 
can supervise shop.” 
 
Both Julie and Angie’s experiences reflect the issues inherent in discretionary policy. 
What seems black and white to some is without doubt grey to others, and these determinations 
are largely rooted in deeply held – and sometimes unexamined - beliefs. These in turn are shaped 
by shifting discursive constructions that have, over hundreds of years, moved only slightly from 
a view that lone mothers are at very least lazy, and likely as well, morally suspect. Discretionary 
power over supplementary benefits invites these judgments from those in the system – whether at 
the levels of senior management, supervisors, or case workers. As the preceding discussion 
reveals, although individual workers and managers can resist, can operate with a different ethos, 
the pressures of the organizational culture can be difficult for an individual worker to resist and 
these dominant cultural constructions affect the operating culture in an organization like TESS. 
 
Rationalizing the Rationing 
 
Tracy observed that “some…caseworkers [act as though] the money is coming from their 
own bank account”.  Several of the case workers agreed that these types of responses often arise 
because a negative culture is passed onto new caseworkers who quickly realize that in order to fit 
in they too must take up the dominant rhetoric around social assistance recipients. Cory 
complained: 
 
“One of my frustrations is … with the culture of working as a case worker,… there's a lot 
of negativity [among] my fellow caseworkers. I think it’s also because we work so close 
to each other. We don't even have dividers between us,…. So there's always talking and it 
might develop a culture of the clients getting too much, and ‘this special diet should be 
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taken away’ [sarcasm]. …And I'd have to say it's pretty constant and I find it happening 
daily. And if you're not on board with that, it's sort of like… ‘we’re not talking to you’.”  
 
Maggie, who has experienced many different caseworkers, articulates the 
interconnectedness among all of these spheres of interaction and their ultimate effects on the lone 
mothers who are reliant on welfare: 
 
“All in all, I would say, [welfare system administration] needs help… They need a whole 
new cleaning out, a whole new system. They need to turn around and look at what they 
do to people.  @ot what they give them.  What they do to them…   
 
Neety offers this concluding thought “they help you, but they destroy you” and such 
destruction that Neety feels occurs through these rationing processes that continually question 




Supplementary benefits could substantially ameliorate some of the financial burden lone 
mothers endure if their allocation was equitable.  A lone mother’s ability to access these funds is 
based upon factors that may have little to do with her legitimate need and formal eligibility, so 
that, effectively, practice, in the hands of caseworkers, contravenes the policy intention. Many of 
the same rationing processes argued to be employed in health care schemes are being employed 
in social assistance frameworks as well. 
 
The findings indicate that how a lone mother and her children fare economically is often 
dependent upon the size and type of case load her case worker maintains.  Case workers with 
smaller and/or specialized case loads argued that they were able to become ‘masters of their 
trade’ and were more aware of the supplementary benefits available to lone mothers. 
Additionally, the caseworker focus group revealed that regardless of what is stated in the policy 
itself, a lone mother’s ability to access additional money is often contingent on the office 
supervisor, the relations between the supervisor and the caseworker, and the overall office 
culture. Interestingly, while the case workers who worked in offices with ‘harsh’ supervisors 
indicated that they could not fight for extra benefits for their clients, they all indicated that if 
their client screamed and yelled at the supervisor they would be more likely to receive extras.  
This did not appear to correspond to the reportage of lone mothers themselves who clearly saw a 
connection between having information about a benefit buttressing their claim for it, but did not 
voice awareness of a connection between assertiveness and self advocacy and getting a benefit 
approved. This disconnect raises questions about caseworkers’ expectations and comfort with 
clients as informed consumers and advocates. In the same way that information detailing the 
various supplementary benefits seems so difficult to obtain, one wonders about the extent to 
which the culture of welfare policy has moved beyond an expectation that the modern day alms 
recipient should be grateful for what they get. The briefest perusal of the Canadian government 
website on pensions offers stark contrast to the experience of the welfare client, providing as it 
does detailed information on benefits and eligibility. Clearly the pension ‘client’, is seen to have 
a right to full disclosure of the potential benefits and on that basis to make their claim. While the 
supplementary benefits provided under Ontario Works indeed provide the possibility of 
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ameliorating the too-small standard benefit, their situating as a fully discretionary benefit puts 
too much power in the hands of a welfare delivery body which, as the caseworker dialogue so 
clearly reveals, is inconsistent in approach and lacks, at both frontline and management levels, a 
unifying ideology. That there are these values inconsistencies remains both troubling and not 
surprising as the very idea of 'welfare' reflects the conflicting ideologies that underlie a public 
discourse of disentitlement and moral judgment, softened by other ideological currents, 
contemporarily less dominant, of social justice and citizen equality. This idea, that welfare is 
ideologically driven and reflects the prevailing discursive values is not new (Little, 1998; Peck, 
2005) but its continuing relevance is reflected in our discussion of the rationing of supplementary 
benefits.  
 
These countervailing ideological perspectives run through the data considered here and 
reflect this continued public discourse that subjects single mothers to reluctant entitlement and 
intense scrutiny based on their perceived deservingness. As Fraser (1997), Mouffe (1992), Orloff 
(1993), and others have argued, women's citizenship claims continue to be more marginal and 
conditional than men's. This is evidenced as it is women - in such high percentage-who become 
the sole care givers of their children, occupy the marginal and precarious labour market roles that 
drive their application for state support, and are then subject to significant material deprivation 
through the basic welfare benefit. Although the supplementary benefits discussed might 
marginally improve these circumstances, worker discretion and its accompanying rationing 
processes reflect social values and their expression in the public discourse that makes invisible 
women's reproductive labour roles. Lone mothers are snared in a net of dubious morality, the 
extraction from which is itself fraught as it cannot involve resistance, assertion, or advocacy.  
 
These deeply gendered social processes are reinforced as well by the precariousness of 
the very workers who are charged with rationing. The contemporary welfare worker is very 
likely a woman, less likely to have credentials particular to her role, and often a lone mother. In 
the City of Toronto, Canada's fourth largest welfare deliverer, a full 82% of caseworkers are 
women (B. Ruffett, personal communication, May, 2010). As women, and low-on-the-totem-
pole workers, they are subject to the type of scrutiny and oversight congruent with a neoliberal 
welfare regime with its focus on cost containment and a meager benefit distribution. In one 
unnamed welfare office, management posted a picture of 'Santa Claus of the Month’, identifying 
the worker who had issued the highest level of benefit payments in the month. Although this is 
perhaps an extreme response, perhaps not endorsed by senior management, it very likely reflects 
the ideology underlying welfare delivery and the message to workers is clear. In this 
environment keeping an emotional distance between themselves and those they serve is critical 
to their construction of the welfare lone mom as the 'other' which in turn sustains their own 
ability to function as a gate keeping ‘rationer’ of benefits and services. 
 
Policy is always only as good as its delivery practices, and as we have discussed, 
practices that involve worker discretion in a welfare delivery system characterized by 
conditionality and disentitlement, are likely to reflect these values and their underlying neo-
liberal ideology. In this environment discretion becomes rationing. If there are policy goals 
oriented to different outcomes and practices, then these must be clearly reflected in the training 
provided to frontline and management staff in clear values statements and in the availability of 
full information about available benefits.  
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